Somehow, this passage from John Rawls Political Liberalism seems relevant to Egypt, to anti-creationism, to the disputes over gnu atheism, and even to a forthcoming reply to Martin Cothran on the nature of human rights:
Now the serious problem is this. A modern democratic society is characterized not simply by a pluralism of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines but by a pluralism of incompatible yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines. No one of these doctrines is affirmed by citizens generally. Nor should one expect that in the foreseeable future one of them, or some other reasonable doctrine, will ever be affirmed by all, or nearly all, citizens. Political liberalism assumes that, for political purposes, a plurality of reasonable yet incompatible comprehensive doctrines is the normal result of the exercise of human reason within the framework of the free institutions of a constitutional democratic regime. Political liberalism also supposes that a reasonable comprehensive doctrine does not reject the essentials of a democratic regime. Of course, a society may also contain unreasonable and irrational, and even mad, comprehensive doctrines. In their case the problem is to contain them so that they do not undermine the unity and justice of society.
The point being that pluralism is good, necessary, and inevitable, and our political processes should not assume some single doctrine or worldview, but should work to find ideas and policies agreeable across this diversity. Doctrines which are, or which seem to be harmful or irrational are to be contained, not eradicated.